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ABSTRACT 
 
The precise legal definition of crimes against humanity has always been elusive since their 
first codification in the IMT Charter in 1945. Jurisprudence applying the definition has 
reflected the uncertainty especially with regard to the contextual element that requires that 
crimes against humanity should be committed pursuant to some form of a policy of a state 
or organisation: The Policy Element. In the 1990s the ICTY in its early Decisions 
exhibited an inclination to broaden the scope of the application of crimes against humanity 
by downgrading the Policy Element to cover states and non-state actors in asymmetric 
armed conflicts. In 2002, this tendency culminated in the complete abandonment of the 
Policy Element requirement. Eminent international criminal law scholars are divided 
whether the ICTY was correct or not. At the same time, Article 7(2) (a) of ICC Statute has 
expressly provided for a downgraded Policy Element that somehow resonates with the 
ICTY as it covers states and organisations. In 2010, the Situation in the Republic of Kenya 
presented the ICC with a question whether the concept of organisation in Article 7(2) (a) 
of the Statute covers organisations generally or only state-like organisations. The Majority 
Decision resonated with the more recent jurisprudence of the ICTY and held that it 
covered all organisations. The Dissenting Opinion, however, restricted the Policy Element 
to only state-like organisations. This Research agrees with the recent ICTY position that 
has been reflected by the Majority Decision and postulates that the Policy Element should 
not be a requirement for crimes against humanity. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1 The Concept and Relevance of the Policy Element for Crimes against Humanity 
 
The term ‘Policy Element’ for crimes against humanity does not have a precise legal 
definition.
1 
 There is very little in the literature – and even less in practice – as to what 
the Policy Element exactly means. One attempt at a definition goes follows: 
‘An agreement, plan or practice pursued by or on behalf of a government, 
authorities, or bodies, official or nonofficial, for the purpose or with a view to 
commit, aid or support criminal activities.’2 
The above definition, though admittedly not the most precise, generally captures the 
essence of the Policy Element in crimes against humanity. Understood as defined 
above, the Policy Element seems to be grounded on the idea that for ordinary crimes 
to amount to crimes against humanity they must be part of a plan or agreed scheme of 
some authorities.
3
 The Policy Element does not focus on the individual ordinary 
crimes but provides a favourable environment for the perpetration of such crimes on a 
                                                          
1
 Mettraux, G. ‘The Definition of Crimes against Humanity and the Question of a “Policy” Element,’ in Sadat, 
L. (Ed), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (2011), 142; Robinson, D., Defining ‘Crimes 
against Humanity’ at the Rome Conference,’ (1999) American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 44; and 
Jalloh, C., What makes a Crime against Humanity a Crime against Humanity, (2013), vol. 28, 392. 
2
 Mettraux, G. (2011:143). 
3
 Mettraux, G. (2011:143). 
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massive scale.
4
 The ordinary crimes comprise killings and extermination of civilian 
populations, enslavement through forced labour, expulsion of people from their native 
regions, arbitrary imprisonment or torture of political opponents, rape of defenceless 
women, and persecution through discriminatory laws and measures, among others.
5
 
In defining crimes against humanity, protagonists of the existence of the Policy 
Element requirement argue that the Policy Element provides a legal linkage between 
otherwise unconnected ordinary crimes committed in the context of an attack against 
a civilian population.
6
  
Generally, crimes against humanity envisage the commission of any of the ordinary 
crimes listed above in the context of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian 
population.
7
 For the protagonists, the attack on a civilian population has to be 
instigated or encouraged by authorities of the state or otherwise, in form of some 
discernible policy.  
Hence, the Policy Element is vital in that it transcends ordinary crimes into crimes 
against humanity. As a result, the Policy Element requirement is further argued to 
have evidentiary consequences for those engaged in the prosecution of crimes against 
humanity: The Judges, Prosecutors and the Defence.  
There are antagonistic arguments that firmly hold that the Policy Element is not a 
requirement for crimes against humanity.  This has resulted into several debates 
concerning the existence or non-existence of the Policy Element requirement for 
crimes against humanity. The debates are still unsettled to date. 
                                                          
4 Mettraux, G. (2011:143). 
5
 Werle, G. (2009:288). For a more comprehensive list of acts covered as crimes against humanity see Article 
7(1) of the ICC Statute. 
6
 Mettraux, G. (2011:143); and Werle, G., (2009:288). 
7 Werle, G. (2009:292). 
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1.1.2 The Policy Element Debates 
 
The Policy Element requirement for crimes against humanity is in a state of flux 
currently. There are two distinct but interconnected debates raging on. The first one 
relates to the divergent views as regards whether it is a legal requirement for crimes 
against humanity in international criminal law. On the one hand, the ICTY
8
 and some 
eminent international criminal law scholars firmly hold the position that the Policy 
Element is not a legal requirement for crimes against humanity under customary 
international law.
9
 On the other hand, equally eminent scholars firmly advocate the 
existence of such a legal requirement.
10
  
The second debate concerns only the protagonists of the existence of the Policy 
Element requirement. There is divergence as to whether the Policy Element envisaged 
is only that of the state and state-like entities or can be extended to other entities 
generally.
11
 Under the ICC Statute, for example, where the Policy Element is 
expressly provided for as a legal requirement, a debate currently rages on as to 
whether the required Policy Element covers states and organisations in general or 
states and only state-like entities.
12
  
                                                          
8
 The Prosecutor vs. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic ICTY A. Ch. 12.6.2002 para. 98. 
9
 Halling, M., ‘Push the Envelope-Watch it Bend: Removing the Policy Requirement and Extending Crimes 
against Humanity,’ (2010), Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 0, Issue 4, 831; and Mettraux, G., 
‘Crimes against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda’ (2002), 43 Harvard International Law Journal, 237,271-83.  
10
 Kress, C., ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy 
Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision,’ (2010) Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 23, 855-873; Schabas, W., ‘State Policy as an Element of International Crimes,’ (2008), The 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Volume 98, No. 3, 953-982; and Bassiouni, C., Crimes against 
Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (2011), 17. 
11
 Kress, C.,(2010: 855-873); Schabas, W.,(2008:953-982); and the dissenting opinion of Judge Hans Kaul in 
The Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in Republic of Kenya, No ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010; Cf.  Werle, G., and Burghardt, B., ‘Do Crimes 
Against Humanity Require the Participation of a State or a ‘State-like’ Organization?’ Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 10 (2012), 1151-1170; and Bassiouni, C., (2011:17). 
12
 Werle, G., and Burghardt, B.,(2012:1151-1170). 
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This state of flux and uncertainty has profound legal ramifications especially in 
delineating the specific scope of crimes against humanity and the discharging of 
evidentiary burdens by those involved in the prosecution of crimes against humanity. 
1.1.3 History of the Debates 
 
Crimes against humanity are amongst the four core crimes under international law at 
present. Like the other core crimes, crimes against humanity first came into the 
spotlight at the end of the Second World War.
13
 Since then, various definitions of 
crimes against humanity have been developed and used in different national, 
internationalised and international contexts over the years. The variance in the 
definitions has entailed a number of challenges concerning the precise definition of 
crimes against humanity as should be understood at present.
14
 This has impacted on 
the precise elements that comprise crimes against humanity. It is the genesis of the 
question whether the Policy Element is a legal requirement or not for crimes against 
humanity. 
Historically, national jurisprudence that has dealt with crimes against humanity after 
the Second World War is available.
15
 However, it is hard to ascertain whether the 
Policy Element was regarded as a legal requirement or not as there is no legal 
                                                          
13
 The offence was included in Article 6 (c) of the IMT Charter, Article 5 (c) of IMTFE Charter and Article II 
(1) of Control Council Law No. 10. See Werle, G., (2009:64). 
14
 The notion of crimes against humanity is challenged as being vague, over-inclusive and thereby in violation 
of the fundamental criminal law principle of nullum crimen sine lege. See DeGuzman, M., ‘Crimes Against 
Humanity’ in Schabas, W.A. & Bernaz, N. (Eds.) Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, (2011), 
127; See also Nilsson, J.,  ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ in Cassese, A., The Oxford Companion to International 
Criminal Justice,(2009),28. 
15
 See The United States of America vs. Alstötter et al. ("The Justice Case") 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), 14 Ann. Dig. 
278; The United States of America vs. Karl Brandt et al. US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 19 July 
1947; The Public Prosecutor vs. Menten 75 ILR 331, 362-363;  France vs. Klaus Barbie 78 ILR 124, Court of 
Cassation, 6 Dec 1983 (France); R vs. Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701, 814 (Canada); Ivan Timofeyevich Polyukhovic 
vs. The Commonwealth 172 CLR 501 (Australia); and R vs. Bow street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and 
Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 A.C. 147(UK). 
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consensus to that effect.
16
 The protagonists for the non-existence of the Policy 
Element claim that the national jurisprudence available did not state that the Policy 
Element is a requirement but merely highlighted the context within which the crimes 
against humanity in issue occurred. On the other hand, the antagonists to this position 
argue that the jurisprudence represents proof for its existence.  
In the 1990s jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR introduced the ‘widespread and 
systematic’ test for crimes against humanity that required that an attack so qualified 
should be directed, instigated or encouraged by the state or an organization.
17
 The 
Tadic Decision was very instrumental in entrenching the Policy Element as 
formulated above as a requirement for crimes against humanity. 
However, the ICTY later on started expressing doubt on the relevance of the Policy 
Element requirement for crimes against humanity.
18
 The doubts culminated in a 
succinct, albeit controversial, pronouncement by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in 
the Kunarac Decision
19
 discarding the Policy Element altogether in crimes against 
humanity as a requirement under customary international law.  
The holding of the ICTY has drawn support from some eminent international criminal 
law scholars like Guenael Mettraux
20
 and Goran Sluiter
21
 who argue that there is 
nothing in customary international law to suggest the existence of the Policy Element 
as a legal requirement for crimes against humanity. 
                                                          
16 Mettraux, G., (2011: 162). 
17
 See The Prosecutor vs. Dusko Tadic ICTY T. Ch. II 7.5. 1997 para. 644; and The Prosecutor vs. Ignace 
Bagilishema ICTR. T. Ch. I 7.6.2001 para. 78.  
18
 See The Prosecutor vs. Kunarac et al ICTY T. Ch. II. 22.2.2001 para. 432; The Prosecutor vs. Kupreskic 
ICTY T. Ch. II 14.1.2000 paras. 554-5; The Prosecutor vs. Kordic ICTY T. Ch. 26.2. 2001 paras. 181-2; The 
Prosecutor vs. Krnojelac ICTY T. Ch. II 15.3.2002 para. 58. 
19
 The Prosecutor vs. Kunarac et al (2002) para. 98.  
20
 Mettraux, G., (2011:162). 
21
 Sluiter, G., ‘Chapeau Elements of Crimes against Humanity of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals,’ in 
Sadat, L. (Ed), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (2011), 129. 
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Despite the Kunarac Decision and its obvious support by some eminent scholars, 
Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute expressly provides for the Policy Element as a 
required contextual element for crimes against humanity covered under the Statute. In 
fact, in a recent decision on the authorisation to commence investigations into the 
post-election violence in Kenya,
22
 the ICC adopted an expansive interpretation of the 
Policy Element requirement under Article 7(2) (a) to authorise investigations for 
alleged crimes against humanity.  
There are also other scholars who assert that under existing customary international 
law crimes against humanity do require the Policy Element. For these scholars, there 
exists sufficient state practice and opinio juris since the inception of the concept of 
crimes against humanity that the Policy Element is a requirement for crimes against 
humanity. 
For instance, William Schabas,
23
 Cherif Bassiouni
24
 and Claus Kress
25
 advocate for 
the existence of the Policy Element requirement for crimes against humanity under 
customary international law. These scholars agree that discarding the Policy Element 
outright has the potential to makes crimes against humanity applicable to, as Schabas 
argues: serial killers, the Mafia, motorcycle gangs and small terrorist bands. The 
Policy Element is, therefore, the requirement that transcends common waves of crime 
into the international criminal law arena in the form of crimes against humanity. 
After the ICC Statute was negotiated in 1998 another debate was birthed when the 
ICC interpreted Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statue in the Decision on the Authorisation 
                                                          
22
 Decision on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Republic of Kenya, No: ICC-01/09 31 
March 2010. 
23
 Schabas, W., (2008: 953-982). 
24
 Bassiouni, C., (2011:17). 
25
 Kress, C., (2010: 855-873). 
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of Investigations in Kenya
26
 in 2010. Despite the express provision of the Policy 
Element as a requirement, Judges of the ICC that presided over the matter and 
scholars that have commented on it are divided as to whether the term ‘organisational 
policy’ covers states and only organisations that are ‘state-like’ or covers states and 
organisations in general.  
The Majority Decision adopted an interpretation of the Policy Element under Article 
7(2) (a) that covers states and organisations in general. The late Judge Peter-Hans 
Kaul dissented and instead opted for a stringent interpretation of the Policy Element 
that covered states and only ‘state-like’ organisations.  
The reasoning underlying the Dissenting Opinion is supported by Claus Kress. Kress 
argues that the state practice and opinio juris, as observed since Nuremberg, indicates 
the existence of customary international law requiring the Policy Element envisaged 
being either that of a state or state-like organisation.  
On the other hand, Gerhard Werle and Boris Burghardt
27
 advocate for an approach 
that focuses on the ordinary meaning of the term ‘organisational policy’ in 
interpreting the Policy Element in the ICC Statute. According to Werle and Burghardt 
the ordinary meaning of phraseology employed to manifest the Policy Element in 
article 7(2) (a) covers any organisation with sufficient capacity to carry out the 
widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population.  
The above exposition evidences the debates concerning the Policy Element 
requirement in crimes against humanity at present. In light of the above, it is clear that 
some uncertainty lingers in international criminal law at present as to whether the 
                                                          
26
 Decision on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Republic of Kenya, 31 March 2010. 
27
 Werle, G., and Burghardt, B., (2012:1151-1170); and Bassiouni, C., (2011:17). 
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Policy Element is a legal requirement in crimes against humanity and the precise 
limits of Policy Element under the ICC Statute. 
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
 
1.2.1 Research Questions 
 
The debate over the Policy Element is as much a debate over whether it does or does 
not form part of the definition of crimes against humanity, as it is a debate over 
whether it should or should not be part of it.
28
 
In light of the above, the research question cannot be reduced to one: It has several 
constituent questions. The over-arching questions that the research intends to survey 
are: Whether the Policy Element is a legal requirement for crimes against humanity? 
Whether the Policy Element should be a requirement for crimes against humanity at 
all? 
Inherent in the overarching questions are the following questions, the survey of which 
will help to delineate the scope of the research: what are the justifications for the 
divergent views from the ICTY, the ICC and eminent scholars regarding the Policy 
Element requirement? What are the legal ramifications of having or not having the 
Policy Element requirement in international criminal law? Is it necessary that the 
Policy Element should be a requirement at all?  
1.2.2 Significance of the Research 
 
As seen above, the Policy Element requirement in crimes against humanity is in a 
state of flux currently. This research intends to survey the debate at present and to 
                                                          
28
 Mettraux, G. (2011:145) 
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analyse the justifications for and ramifications of the opinions advanced so far. This 
research will also attempt  to provide a comprehensive understanding of the nuances 
involved and the profound legal ramifications the state of flux in which the Policy 
Element requirement in crimes against humanity is at present has in international 
criminal law. 
 
The research will further attempt recommendations as to whether the Policy Element 
should be a legal requirement for crimes against humanity. 
1.3 CONCLUSION 
 
To surmise the above, the Policy Element requirement in crimes against humanity is 
in a state of flux at present as evidenced by the uncertainty as to whether it is a legal 
requirement in international criminal law or not. Two distinct but interconnected 
debates are raging on at present regarding the Policy Element. Firstly, it is not settled 
whether the Policy Element is a requirement for crimes against humanity at customary 
international law or not. Secondly, the also divergence as to whether the term 
‘organisational policy’ under the ICC Statute envisages any organisation or only an 
organisation that is state-like.  
 
Consequently, this research intends to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
debates concerning the Policy Element for crimes against humanity. Further, it will 
attempt recommendations that would potentially minimise divergence. 
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 CHAPTER TWO 
THE PROTAGONIST ARGUMENT FOR THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE 
POLICY ELEMENT REQUIREMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1990s, the jurisprudence from the ICTY and ICTR suggested that crimes against 
humanity required not only that an attack against a civilian population should be 
widespread or systematic but should also be directed, instigated or encouraged by a state 
or an organization.
29
 This position was heralded as being supported by international 
instruments and a plethora of international and national jurisprudence concerning crimes 
against humanity.
30
 
The above position changed in 2002 when the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, in its 
Kunarac Decision, held that the Policy Element was not a legal requirement for crimes 
against humanity. The reasoning for the holding was that the Policy Element was neither 
a requirement under the statute of the ICTY nor was it existent at customary international 
law. There are some eminent legal scholars in support of this position. 
This chapter will firstly survey and engage the Appeal Chambers holding in the Kunarac 
Decision, concentrating on the reasoning of the ICTY in discarding the Policy Element as 
a requirement for crimes against humanity. Secondly, the chapter will survey and engage 
arguments of scholars in support of the above position 
                                                          
29
The Prosecutor vs. DuskoTadic ICTY T. Ch. II 7.5. 1997 para. 644; and The Prosecutor vs. Ignace 
Bagilishema 2001 para. 78. 
30
 See The United States of America vs. Alstötter et al. ("The Justice Case") 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), 14 Ann. Dig. 
278; The United States of America vs. Karl Brandt et al. US Military Tribunal Nuremberg, Judgment of 19 July 
1947; The Public Prosecutor vs. Menten 75 ILR 331, 362-363;  France vs. Klaus Barbie 78 ILR 124, Court of 
Cassation, 6 Dec 1983 (France); R vs. Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701, 814 (Canada); Ivan Timofeyevich Polyukhovic 
vs. The Commonwealth 172 CLR 501 (Australia); and R vs. Bow street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and 
Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) [2000] 1 A.C. 147(UK). 
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2.2 THE KUNARAC DECISION  
2.2.1 Brief Background  
 
The relevant facts of the Kunarac Decision concern an armed conflict between 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims from 1992 to 1993 in the area of Foca, a 
municipality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1992 Foca fell under the control of 
Serbian paramilitaries. As a result non-Serb civilians were killed, raped or otherwise 
abused by the Serbian paramilitaries.  
In 2001, the appellants, Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, who 
took active part in the armed conflict as members of the paramilitaries, were charged 
with crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Trial Chamber of the ICTY. They 
were convicted on all charges and sentenced to 28 years, 20 years and 12 years 
respectively.
31
 
The appellants appealed to the Appeals Chamber against both their convictions and 
the sentences. They lodged several grounds of appeal including alleged errors by the 
Trial Chamber with respect to: (i) its finding that Article 3 of the ICTY Statute applies 
to their conduct; (ii) its finding that Article 5 of the Statute applies to their conduct; 
(iii) its definitions of the offences charged; (iv) the cumulative charging; and (v) the 
cumulative convictions entered by the ICTY.
32
 
Of particular importance to this discussion, the appellants contended that the crimes 
against humanity as defined under the statute of ICTY required that crimes against 
humanity against the non-Serb Muslim women should be committed in furtherance of 
a plan or a policy. The appellants therefore had to have requisite knowledge of that 
                                                          
31
 The Prosecutor vs. Kunarac et al (2002) paras. 10, 18 and 22. 
32
 The Prosecutor vs. Kunarac et al (2002) para. 24. 
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plan or policy and a demonstrable willingness to participate in its furtherance. With 
that premise, the appellants contended that the charges of crimes against humanity 
could not hold since the crimes they were accused of were disparate and there was no 
proof that the appellants had been in contact during the armed conflict. In essence, 
they argued that there was no evidence of any common plan or common purpose to 
commit the crimes against the non-Serb Muslim women.
33
 
The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument and held that the statute of the ICTY 
does not require the Policy Element for crimes against humanity. The Chamber went 
further to hold that there is no such requirement under customary international law. 
Below is the reasoning of the ICTY. 
2.2.2 The Requirement of a Policy Element 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that since neither the ICTY Statute nor 
customary international law at the time of the alleged acts required proof of the 
existence of a plan or policy to commit the said acts, it could not justify a finding that 
the Policy Element was a requirement for the charges of the crimes against humanity. 
The ICTY further held that the legal elements for crimes against humanity included: 
proof of an attack against a civilian population; and that the said attack should be 
widespread or systematic. However, to prove these elements, it was not necessary to 
establish that they were the result of the existence of a policy or plan. The existence of 
a plan or policy could be useful to establish these two elements. However, it was 
entirely possible to establish the said elements without reference to any plan or policy.  
                                                          
33
 The Prosecutor vs. Kunarac et al (2002) para. 75. 
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In sum, therefore, the existence of a policy or plan could merely be of probative value 
in appropriate circumstances, but in the legal scheme of the ICTY it was not a 
required element for crimes against humanity.
34
 
The ICTY further attested to the existence of a debate in the jurisprudence of the 
tribunal as to whether a policy or plan constituted an element of the definition of 
crimes against humanity. However, the ICTY, in a single footnote, categorically 
dismissed the existence of the Policy Element thus: ‘The practice reviewed by the 
Appeals Chamber overwhelmingly supports the contention that no such requirement 
exists under customary international law.’35  
In its assessment the ICTY cited the following as buttressing the conclusion that the 
Policy Element is non-existent under customary international law: The absence of the 
Policy Element as a requirement under Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and 
Article II (1)(c) of Control Council Law No 10; The dearth of an express 
pronouncement of its existence in the Nuremberg Judgement and a plethora of other 
judgments from international or national fora in which crimes against humanity 
featured; The non-inclusion of an express Policy Element requirement in the United 
Nations Supplements on crimes against humanity;
36
 And the fact that the Appeals 
Chamber in the Jelisic Decision
37
 found that the Policy Element was non-existent for 
purposes of the crime of Genocide. 
                                                          
34
 The Prosecutor vs. Kunarac et al (2002) para. 98.  
35
 The Prosecutor vs. Kunarac et al (2002 :30) footnote 114. 
36
 These included: Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 
(1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, paras 47-48; Yearbook of the International Law Commission (ILC), 1954, vol. II, 
150; Report of the ILC on the work of its 43
rd
 session, 29 April – 19 July 1991, Supplement No 10 (UN Doc No 
A/46/10), 265-266; its 46th session, 2 May – 22July 1994, Supplement No 10 (UN Doc No A/49/10), 75-76; its 
47th session, 2 May – 21 July 1995, 47, 49 and 50;its 48th session, 6 May – 26 July 1996, Supplement No 10 
(UN Doc No A/51/10), 93 and 95-96. 
37
 The Prosecutor vs. Goran Jelisic Case No. IT-10-95-T 14 December 1999. 
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The ICTY made attempts to distinguish some prior judgments that had been used in 
support of the existence of the Policy Element requirement. Firstly, the ICTY 
distinguished the Decision of the Dutch Supreme Court in The Public Prosecutor vs. 
Menten.
38
 The Menten Decision held that Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter 
required that a crime against humanity be committed in connection with some plan or 
policy. The Menten Decision was distinguished on the basis that the court clearly 
went beyond the text of the applicable statute since the express wording of the Charter 
does not contain such a requirement.  
Secondly, the ICTY distinguished The Supreme Court of the British Zone Decisions.
39
 
The ICTY held that the reference to a policy or plan in the Decisions was merely to 
highlight the factual circumstances, and not recognition of an independent legal 
requirement.   
Finally, the ICTY looked at the In re Alstötter Decision.
40
 This Decision is often 
quoted in support of the Policy Element requirement. The ICTY, however, found that 
the ratio decidendi of this case lending support to the existence of the Policy Element 
requirement does not constitute an authoritative statement of customary international 
law. 
2.2.3 Observations 
This Research finds that the Kunarac Decision represented a fundamental shift on the 
treatment of the Policy Element in crimes against humanity. That aside, it is 
noteworthy, however, that the reasoning for the conclusion reached by the ICTY does 
                                                          
38
 The Public Prosecutor vs. Menten 75 ILR 331, 362-363. 
39
 OGH br. Z.,vol. I, 19. 
40
 The United States of America vs. Alstötter et al. ("The Justice Case") 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), 14 Ann. Dig. 278, 
284. 
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not come out clearly in the decision. The ‘overwhelming practice’ that the ICTY 
reviewed to discard the Policy Element requirement is found in a single footnote.
41
  
Further, the analysis that led to concluding that the Policy Element is not a 
requirement under customary international law falls far short of the requirements set 
out in Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ); 
international custom can be verified by surveying evidence of general practice 
accepted as law.
42
  Regardless of the conclusion reached, the ICTY ought to have 
dedicated a fair amount of attention to methodically assess the state practice and 
opinio juris regarding the existence or non-existence of the Policy Element.  
An assessment of the presence of international custom is spelt out in the Continental 
Shelf Decision.
43
 The Decision requires that:  
‘Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must 
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring 
it.’ 
A more expansive test is provided for in the Nicaragua Decision.
44
 In the Decision, 
the ICJ expanded the sources used to assess international custom to include its own 
previous decisions and also less directly to statements made by the ILC. It is only 
after engaging itself in an assessment as enunciated in these two Decisions that the 
ICTY could make a plausible finding of the existence or non-existence of as rule of 
customary international law. The lack of such an elaborate and methodical assessment 
                                                          
41
 The Prosecutor vs. Kunarac et al (2002:30) footnote 114. 
42
 Article 38 is taken here as the starting point, on the basis that it is generally recognized as a statement of 
sources of international law, without its applicability being limited to the work of the ICJ. 
43
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment 20 February 1969, I.C.J. Reports (1969) para. 77. 
44
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. The United States), Judgment 27 
June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, 14 para. 190 and 202. See also Leopard, D., Customary International Law: A 
New Theory with Practical Applications (2010), at 132.  
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thus presents a major weakness in the reasoning of the finding by the ICTY in the 
Kunarac Decision that the Policy Element is non-existent under customary 
international law.
45
 
2.2.4 Legal Ramifications 
The Research opines that the finding that the Policy Element was not a requirement 
for crimes against humanity at customary international law meant that the acts 
committed in Foca that qualified as crimes against humanity included the otherwise 
disparate acts of the Appellants as long as they comprised a widespread or systematic 
attack against the civilian population. There need not have been a plan or policy in 
furtherance of which the appellants must have been acting.   
This served as an expansion of the ambit of crimes against humanity as acts not 
connected through a plan or policy could now be considered as crimes against 
humanity as long as they were committed in a widespread and systematic manner. 
The appellants, who had carried out disparate crimes not connected with any policy or 
plan, could be held responsible for crimes against humanity. 
Further, the finding mitigated the evidential burden for the prosecution.  There was no 
need for the prosecution to prove the existence of the Policy Element.  
Lastly, being a decision of the Appeals Chamber, the Research opines the Decision 
had authoritative value to determine direction of jurisprudence in the ICTY and the 
ICTR with particular regard to crimes against humanity.
46
  
 
                                                          
45
 Mettraux, G. (2011:143); and Sluiter, G., (2011: 129). 
46
 The Prosecutor vs. Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 181–82 (Feb. 26, 
2001). The ICTY concluded that ‘the existence of a plan or policy should better be regarded as indicative of the 
systematic character of offences charged as crime against humanity’ rather than as an independent, additional 
element of the definition of this crime. For jurisprudence in the ICTR that relied on the Kunarac Decision see 
The Prosecutor vs. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment (May 15, 2003); and Sylvestre 
Gacumbitsi vs. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, (June 17, 2004). 
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2.3 SCHOLARLY ARGUMENTS 
There are scholars who advocate for the position similar to that in the Kunarac 
Decision. The discussion will not focus on specific scholars but rather the heads of 
argument propounded. Unlike the Kunarac Decision above, the arguments of the 
scholars are detailed and demonstrably methodically assessed. The arguments below 
have been gleaned from discussions of several scholars including Guenael Mettraux, 
Goran Sluiter, Charles Jalloh and Mark Osiel. The dominant voice will be that of 
Mettraux as he has tackled almost all the arguments looked at by the other scholars. 
2.3.1 No Evidence of the Policy Element Requirement in Jurisprudence and Instruments 
This argument propounds that a survey of the national and international jurisprudence 
and instruments on crimes against humanity, overwhelmingly supports the non-
existence of the Policy Element for crimes against humanity than its existence.
47
 This 
argument retraces the historical path of crimes against humanity to ascertain whether 
the Policy Element requirement was expressly or impliedly provided for in legally 
binding instruments and other instruments that have informed international criminal 
law and also jurisprudence applying the said instruments.  
2.3.1.1 Instruments 
 
The starting point for this argument is the end of the Second World War in 1945 when 
crimes against humanity were for the first time explicitly included in article 6 of the 
IMT Charter.
48
 They were later also included in article 5 (c) of the IMTFE Charter, 
                                                          
47
 Mettraux, G., (2011: 145); and Sluiter, G., (2011: 129). 
48
 Sluiter, G., “Chapeau Elements” of Crimes against Humanity of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals, in 
Sadat, L. (Ed), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (2011), 105-6. 
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and thereafter in article II (1) of Control Council Law No. 10 in 1946, albeit with 
some variations.
49
  
In 1950 the definition of crimes against humanity as formulated in the IMT Charter 
was affirmed in the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Decision of the Tribunal adopted by the International 
Law Commission.
50
  
In the early 1990s crimes against humanity were also incorporated into the 
constitutive statutes of the ICTY
51
 and the ICTR.
52
 Similarly, as was the case with the 
IMT, the IMTFE and Control Council Law No. 10 above, the definitions of crimes 
against humanity in these statutes varied considerably.
53
  
The argument asserts that a survey of the various formulations of the definition of 
crimes against humanity in all the instruments reveals that not once was the Policy 
Element expressly referred to as a requirement.
54
 
The absence of the express reference to the Policy Element in the pre-ICC Statute 
instruments is argued to be proof for the non-existence of the general requirement for 
Policy Element. The reasoning behind is that, if indeed the Policy Element was a legal 
requirement then it would have been so central as to be expressly provided for in any 
of the instruments defining crimes against humanity. 
                                                          
49
 While the IMT and IMTFE Charters required a nexus between crimes against humanity and other crimes 
within said Charters, this requirement was discarded in Control Council Law No. 10. See Werle, G. (2009:289 
para 783); Sluiter, G., (2011:106); and Schabas, W., (2011:108). 
50
 See Principle VI (c) of the  Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal adopted by the International Law Commission and presented to the 
United Nations General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 5
th
 Sess. Supp. No. 12 U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950. 
51
 Article 5 of the ICTY Statute. 
52
 Article 3 of the ICTR Statute. 
53
 While the ICTY requires a nexus between crimes against humanity and an internal or international armed 
conflict, the same is not required by the ICTR. On the other hand the ICTR requires that crimes against 
humanity be committed with a discriminatory intent. See Werle, G., (2009:291 para 787); Sluiter, G., 
(2011:106); and Schabas, W., (2011:109). 
54
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The only exception is article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute which came into being only in 
1998. It expressly provides for the contextual element of crimes against humanity that 
requires that a “widespread or systematic” attack on a civilian population must be 
done in pursuance or furtherance of a ‘state or organizational policy’. Other than this 
provision, none of the earlier constitutive instruments providing for definitions of 
crimes against humanity had included this requirement. 
The scholars have also looked at some non-binding instruments which have informed 
the discourse on crimes against humanity in international criminal law. The most 
important of such instruments are the ILC Draft Codes of Offences against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind (ILC Draft Codes).
55
  
The scholars observed that the ILC Draft Code of 1954 and its successors show a 
contradictory pattern as to the need, content, and role of the Policy Element in crimes 
against humanity.
56
  
Article 2(11) of the 1954 Draft provided that crimes against humanity had to be 
committed ‘by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the 
instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.’ Essentially, there had to be 
some encouragement or condonation by the state which could be in form of a plan or 
policy. It is argued that this was meant to transcend an ordinary crime from the 
domestic realm onto the international one.  Thus, the instigation and toleration by the 
state was the defining factor.  
In the 1991 version of the Draft Code, however, there was no such requirement.
57
 The 
Commentary to the Draft Code merely suggested that the systematicity of the attack 
                                                          
55
 ILC Draft Codes may indicate the state of the law as they reflect the trending legal position at a particular 
time.  
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on a civilian population may consist of a ‘constant practice or … a methodical plan to 
carry out such violations.’ The plan serves to exemplify the systematicity required but 
cannot be said to be a requirement on its own. 
Similarly, there was no Policy Element requirement in the 1995 ILC Draft Code.
58
 
However, in the 1996 Draft, article 18 required that crimes against humanity should 
be “instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group.” 
Ostensibly, this is a clear manifestation of the requirement of the Policy Element.  
With the premises above, the scholars argue that the absence of the Policy Element in 
all the notable instruments providing for crimes against humanity save for the ICC 
Statute and the inconsistent featuring in the ILC Draft Codes only serves to impress 
that the Policy Element is not a requirement for crimes against humanity in 
international criminal law. 
This Research finds merit in the above argument. The absence of the Policy Element 
as a requirement in all notable instruments starting from the IMT Charter to the 
Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR casts doubt on whether the Policy Element was 
intended to be a requirement for crimes against humanity. Additionally, it has been 
seen above, that the definitions of crimes against humanity under the IMT Charter, the 
IMTFE, Control Council Law No. 10, the ICTY and the ICTR all differed in certain 
respects. However, the Policy Element requirement was absent in all of them. This 
fortifies the plausibility that the Policy Element was not envisaged to be a legal 
requirement for crimes against humanity. 
The only exception is the requirement of some Policy Element in the ILC Draft Code 
and its inclusion in the ICC Statute. The Research acknowledges this development but 
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refers to the non-binding nature of the ILC Draft Codes. The Draft Codes merely 
indicated developments envisaged in international criminal law but were not law 
themselves. They were useful to that extent. The inclusion of the Policy Element as a 
requirement in the ICC Statute provides significant evidence that at the time of its 
negotiation the consensus had shifted. However, it remains a plausible argument that 
the inclusion of the Policy Element as a requirement under the ICC Statute does not 
change the historical path of crimes against humanity which indicates that the Policy 
Element was not envisaged as a requirement in all the notable instruments.  
2.3.1.2 Jurisprudence 
 
The scholars looked at the Nuremberg Trial and other Second World War trials in 
which crimes against humanity featured.  They also looked at some selected national 
jurisprudence that concerned crimes against humanity. 
With particular regard to the Nuremberg Trial, they observed that nowhere in the 
Trial
59
 did the Nuremberg Tribunal require a nexus between the crimes against 
humanity and some form of policy or plan.
60
 This was regardless the fact that 
invariably the crimes against humanity were most certainly linked to such a policy or 
plan in practice.  
In relation to other Second World War trials, the scholars focused on trials based on 
Control Council Law No. 10 in the occupied zones.  
Some Decisions in the Supreme Court in the British Zone referred to the need for a 
nexus between the constitutive acts of crimes against humanity and the Nazi policy or 
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 In the Nuremberg Trial, sixteen of the twenty-four defendants were convicted for crimes against humanity. 
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plan. However, like argued above in the Kunarac Decision, the scholars emphasise 
that the court merely highlighted the context in which the constitutive acts of crimes 
against humanity occurred and not stating that it is a legal requirement.
61
 Therefore, 
the definition of crimes against humanity adopted during the Second World War cases 
did not include the Policy Element as a legal requirement.
62
 
Extrapolating the argument further, they argue that the focus of the definitions of 
crimes against humanity adopted during this era was on the scale or systematicity of 
the crimes: that was the distinguishing feature from ordinary isolated crimes.
63
 They 
stress that the definitions for crimes against humanity adopted in the Decisions did not 
require the Policy Element. 
The scholars looked at some national jurisprudence which antagonists claim affirm 
the existence of the Policy Element. Firstly, they looked at the Menten Decision.
64
 
The Decision essentially held that Article 6(c) of the Nuremburg Charter required that 
a crime against humanity must be committed in connection with some plan or policy. 
They argue that the Court clearly went beyond the text of the Charter since the 
express wording of the statute does not contain such a requirement. Further, they 
point out that the Court did not provide authority in form of precedent for the 
inclusion of the Policy Element as a legal requirement. 
Secondly, the protagonists analyse the Alstötter Decision.
65
 The Decision was decided 
in the United States Military Tribunal in occupied Germany. It applied Control 
Council Law No 10. The Tribunal held that crimes against humanity as defined under 
                                                          
61
 Mettraux, G., (2011: 162). 
62
 The Decisions looked at include: the Flick, the Ministries, and the Einsatzgruppen Decisions. 
63
 Mettraux, G., (2011: 162). The decision rendered by a Dutch Special Criminal Court In re Ahlbrecht (No. 2) 
on September 22, 1948 is a fair summary of the jurisprudence under Control Council Law No. 10 on that point. 
64
 The Public Prosecutor vs Menten et al 75 ILR 331, 362-363. 
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the applicable law had to be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases of atrocities or 
persecutions committed by private individuals or with the blessing of government. 
The Tribunal stressed that the ‘conscious participation in systematic governmentally 
organised or approved procedures,’ was key for the atrocities or persecutions to be 
qualify as crimes against humanity.
66
 
The scholars argue that the essence for including a requirement of the Policy Element 
in the Decision was to help the Court distinguish between crimes against humanity 
and ordinary crimes. It is argued that the Court had erroneously delineated the scope 
of crimes against humanity to crimes committed by Germans against German 
nationals only. Thus, it became imperative to distinguish between the crimes against 
humanity and ordinary crimes committed, as both were committed by Germans 
against German nationals. An inventive way of distinguishing was the inclusion of the 
Policy Element, which separated crimes committed in pursuance and furtherance of 
the Nazi Policy and ordinary crimes. They conclude that the inclusion of the Policy 
Element requirement was therefore erroneous. 
Further, the scholars caution that the Allied and German courts, applying Control 
Council Law No 10, were domestic courts that primarily applied domestic law. The 
domestic law applied included provisions from the occupation authorities that would 
have permeated into the application and interpretation of Control Council Law No. 10 
through the Courts.
67
 The Policy Element might have permeated through as part of 
such a provision since Control Council Law No. 10 did not expressly include the 
Policy Element requirement for crimes against humanity.  
                                                          
66
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Apart from the above cases, the scholars have further looked at two Decisions from 
France relied on as authorities for the existence of the Policy Element: Papon and 
Touvier.
68
 They criticise the French Courts for adopting a highly political definition of 
crimes against humanity. It is argued that the Courts were careful to include members 
of the French Resistance as victims of crimes against humanity but then excluded the 
agents of the pro-Nazi French Vichy regime as perpetrators. Mark Osiel describes the 
French definition of crimes against humanity as very telling of ‘moral evasion’ on 
behalf the French regime that did not want to accept responsibility for the role it 
played in the atrocities and persecution of its own Jewish community.
69
 
Finally, the scholars looked at the Canadian Supreme Court’s Decision in R vs. 
Finta
70
. In Finta the Court held that where crimes against humanity are alleged, it is 
imperative for the trial judge to make a finding as to whether the acts alleged 
constituted ‘practical execution of state policy’. The scholars, however, argue that the 
criminal code applied by the Court did not include any Policy Element requirement. 
Further, the Court did not provide precedents that had informed its decision. One of 
the protagonists, Mettraux,
71
 even suggests that the Decision seems to have relied 
exclusively on the opinions of Cherif Bassiouni who is a one of the staunch 
protagonists of the existence of the Policy Element as will be seen later on.  
All in all, the protagonists of the non-existence of the Policy Element requirement for 
crimes against humanity hold that a survey of the international instruments, 
jurisprudence from the international tribunals and some national jurisprudence reveals 
that the only plausible conclusion is that there is no such requirement generally: Save 
                                                          
68
 The Prosecutor vs. Maurice Papon, Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, France, Judgement, 11 June 
2004; and France vs. Paul Touvier, Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, France, Judgement, 27 November 
1992. 
69
 Mettraux, G., (2011: 164); See also Osiel, M. Mass Atrocity, Collective Memory and the Law (1997), 157. 
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for the ICC Statute. This conclusion informs the position taken as regards the Policy 
Element requirement under customary international law.  
This Research also finds merit in this argument. Jurisprudence connected with the 
international instruments will invariably mirror the provisions of the instruments with 
specific regard to elements of crimes. That is to say, where an instrument does not 
expressly provide for an element, there has to be sufficient justification to allow an 
inference that such an element is required. With this reasoning, it is a plausible 
argument that the absence of the Policy Element requirement in the instruments is an 
indication that the element in issue is not a requirement at all.  
2.3.2 No sufficient State Practice and Opinio Juris to justify the existence of the Policy     
Element under Customary International Law 
 As highlighted above, the conclusion that there is no proof in the relevant 
international instruments and jurisprudence casts doubt on the customary nature of the 
requirement. As required in the Nicaragua Decision, evidence of international custom 
must entail sufficient state practice and opinio juris. It is argued that the survey 
reveals that there is no requirement for the Policy Element for crimes against 
humanity. 
 Further, the definition of crimes against humanity contained in the Nuremberg 
Charter is generally considered to be the authoritative definition under customary 
international law.
72
 As already seen, it makes no explicit reference to a plan or a 
policy.  Therefore the protagonists for the non-existence of the Policy element 
conclude that there is no such requirement under customary international law. 
                                                          
72
 See IMT Judgement, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, at 254, 461 (1947–1949): ‘The 
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This Research also finds merit in this argument in that there is inconsistent state 
practice to support an inference of the existence of international custom requiring the 
Policy Element for crimes against humanity.  
It also stands to reason that the debate whether the Policy Element requirement is 
existent at customary international law or not serves to fortify the conclusion that it is 
not existent. This is so because as required in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, 
international custom is verifiable by state practice of rules accepted as law. The 
divergence in the treatment of the Policy Element requirement as exemplified by the 
current debate, serves to fortify the reasoning that the Policy Element is not generally 
accepted as a requirement and hence not part of customary international law.  
2.3.3 Legal Ramifications  
The view that the Policy Element is not a requirement for crimes against humanity at 
customary international law has several legal ramifications in international criminal 
law.  
The Research observes that the first ramification concerns the ambit of cases of 
crimes that could qualify as crimes against humanity. As observed earlier in this 
paper, the Policy Element is seen by some, as the factor that transcends ordinary 
crimes to crimes against humanity in international criminal law. Thus, without the 
Policy Element requirement, crimes committed by serial killers, the Mafia, 
motorcycle gangs and terrorist bands could qualify as crimes against humanity so long 
as they are committed in a widespread and systematic manner.
73
  
                                                          
73
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This can be seen a desirable consequence especially in the wake of proliferation of 
asymmetric warfare where the capacity of non-state entities to orchestrate and carry 
out attacks on the civilian population rivals, and at times, supersedes that of states. 
Further, the non-existence of the Policy Element requirement at customary 
international law mitigates the evidential burden for the prosecution generally. There 
would be no need for the prosecution to prove the existence of the Policy Element. 
2.4  CONCLUSION. 
To surmise, the ICTY, in the Kunarac Decision, is heralded as having expressly 
discarded the Policy Element for crimes against humanity on the basis that it did not 
exist under customary international law.  However, the ICTY did not elaborate 
adequately on the basis of such a monumental finding.  
Legal scholars also render their support to the finding of the ICTY. In essence, they 
argue that there is no proof in the instruments and the jurisprudence since the 
inception of crimes against that the Policy Element is a requirement. This Research 
finds merit in this argument. 
The Research further observes that the non-existence of the Policy Element 
requirement at customary international law has legal ramifications in international 
criminal law: Widespread and systematic crimes committed by private entities could 
qualify as crimes against humanity; and mitigating the evidential burden for the 
prosecution generally. 
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 CHAPTER THREE 
THE PROTAGONIST ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE POLICY 
ELEMENT REQUIREMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
There are scholars who assert that under existing customary international law, crimes 
against humanity do require the Policy Element. For these scholars, there exists 
sufficient state practice and opinio juris since the inception of the concept of crimes 
against humanity that the Policy Element is a requirement for crimes against 
humanity. 
For instance, William Schabas,
74
 Cherif Bassiouni
75
 and Claus Kress
76
 fervently 
advocate for the existence of the Policy Element requirement for crimes against 
humanity under customary international law.  
This chapter intends to survey the arguments advanced by the scholars and assess the 
legal ramifications of the existence of the Policy Element. The scholars looked at both 
international instruments and available jurisprudence to ascertain the existence of the 
Policy Element. The approach employed by these scholars is similar to the scholars 
that support the non-existence of the Policy Element at customary international law 
discussed above. However, their analysis leads to a different conclusion. The starting 
point is scholarly arguments with respect to international instruments concerning 
crimes against humanity. 
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3.2 SCHOLARLY ARGUMENTS 
3.2.1 The Policy Element Requirement is implied in the Definition of Crimes against 
Humanity in Instruments 
The scholars on this side of the debate also assert that since the first codification of 
crimes against humanity in the IMT Charter in 1945 up to the advent of ICTY Statute 
in 1993, no legally binding instrument expressly provided for the Policy Element as a 
requirement for crimes against humanity.
77
 The only exception came later on in 1998 
in Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute.  
Bassiouni also looked at the constitutive instruments of recent mixed-model 
tribunals
78
 that have provided for definitions of the crimes against humanity.
79
  He 
concluded that none of the constitutive instruments for the mixed-model tribunals 
expressly provides for the Policy Element requirement as well. 
Bassiouni argues that the Policy Element requirement has always been implied in the 
definitions of crimes against humanity since its first codification in the IMT Charter. 
He derives his argument from the premise that all modern formulations of crimes 
against have their genesis in the Article 6 (c) of the IMT Charter.   
Article 6 of the IMT Charter defines the subject-matter jurisdiction of the IMT as 
comprising crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
‘chapeau’ to Article 6 (c) of the IMT Charter requires that persons accused of crimes 
against humanity should have been acting in the interests of the European Axis 
countries whether as individuals or as members of organisations. Additionally, Article 
                                                          
77
 Bassiouni, C., (2011:3); Schabas, W., (2008: 960).  
78
 They are sometimes referred to as ‘Hybrid’ or ‘Internationalised’ courts’. They are a recent creation 
comprising a blend of international and domestic aspects to deal with violations of human rights on ad-hoc basis 
during or after transitional periods of governments. See Dickinson. L. A. ‘The Promise of Hybrid Courts’, 
(2003) The American Journal of International Law Vol. 97 No. 2 295-310. 
79
 The mixed-model tribunals looked at include: The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL); The 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC); The Special Panels of the Dili District Court for 
Timor-Leste; and The Serbian War Crimes Tribunal (for Kosovo). See Bassiouni, C., (2011:6) 
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6 (c) requires that crimes against humanity should be committed ‘in connection with 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,’ namely war crimes and crimes 
against peace.  It is, therefore, argued that by implication crimes against humanity 
under the IMT Charter had to be associated with a state plan or policy, since the 
accused persons would have been acting in the interests of states comprising the 
European Axis.
80
 Further, the linkage between crimes against humanity and other 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the IMT implied an association with a state plan or 
policy since the other crimes were associated with a state plan or policy themselves.
81
   
Thus, extrapolating the argument further, definitions of crimes against humanity, 
being modelled after Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter, invariably presuppose state 
involvement in form of a plan or policy. Essentially, the argument is that for all the 
instruments that do not expressly provide for the Policy Element for crimes against 
humanity, the Policy Element is a requirement that is implied from the very nature of 
crimes against humanity as defined in Article 6 of the IMT Charter. 
Secondly, it is argued that Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute represents a 
fundamental step in entrenching the previously implied Policy Element requirement. 
The gravamen of the argument is that the protagonists for the non-existence of the 
Policy Element at customary international law have neglected to factor in the 
significance of the express inclusion of the Policy Element requirement in Article 7 
(2) (a) of the ICC Statute.
82
 Thus, the express inclusion of the Policy Element in 
Article 7 (2) (a), to a large extent, signifies consensus that the Policy Element is a 
requirement for crimes against humanity. 
                                                          
80
 See Bassiouni, C., (2011:3); Schabas, W., (2008: 954). 
81
 Schabas, W., (2008: 961). 
82
 Bassiouni, C., (2011:7); Schabas, W., (2008: 962). 
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Lastly, it is argued that the ILC Draft Codes, though not binding, support the 
existence of the Policy Element requirement.
83
 The 1954 ILC Draft Code’s definition 
of crimes against humanity is in the following terms:  
‘Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or 
persecution, committed against any civilian population on social, political, 
racial, religious or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private 
individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities.’ 
The italicised portion is argued to have been inserted into the definition after members 
of the ILC realised that after reformulating the Nuremberg definition of crimes against 
humanity by removing the requirement for a nexus to an armed conflict, it became 
difficult to distinguish crimes against humanity and ordinary crimes.
84
 
The ILC Draft Codes were not significantly revised for approximately four decades 
until 1996. As already observed earlier on, Article 18 of the 1996 Draft Code 
provided for some form of Policy Element as a requirement for crimes against 
humanity. The commentary in the Draft Code stated that ‘the instigation or direction 
of a Government or any organisation or group, which may or may not be affiliated 
with a Government, gives the act its great dimension and makes it a crime against 
humanity imputable to private persons or agents of a state’.85 Essentially, the 
argument is that the Policy Element, whether that of a state or an organization, 
transcends ordinary crimes into crimes against humanity.  
Therefore, it is argued that the inclusion of the Policy Element requirement, in 
whatever formulation, in the ILC Draft Codes supports its existence rather than non-
existence. 
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 Schabas, W., (2008: 964). 
84
 Schabas, W., (2008: 964). 
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 Schabas, W., (2008: 965); Bassiouni, C., (2011:10). 
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The Research finds merit in the argument that the Policy Element requirement is 
implied in all the definitions of crimes against humanity since they are modelled on 
Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter. However, there is a reservation.  
The Research finds the implication made not very persuasive. There have been 
several formulations of the definition of crimes against humanity since the IMT 
Charter. The formulations had varied requirements.
86
  Despite the variations, save for 
the ICC Statute, the Policy Element requirement is consistently absent in all the 
instruments. This serves to fortify that the Policy Element is not a general requirement 
for crimes against humanity. If it were, a few formulations should have included it 
expressly. 
Further, assuming the argument that the Policy Element transcends ordinary crimes 
into crimes against humanity holds true, then it is implausible to have such an 
important element merely as an implied requirement. Therefore, the Research finds 
the argument that the Policy Element is an implied requirement not very persuasive. 
The Research also finds merit in the argument that the express inclusion of the Policy 
Element requirement in Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute signifies a consensus that it 
is a general requirement for crimes against humanity. The ICC has 139 signatories 
and 122 ratifications at present.
87
 This represents a significant portion of all the 195 
states in the world.
88
 Therefore it is indeed an indicator for some consensus to the 
effect that the Policy Element is a requirement. However, it has to borne in mind that 
negotiating a treaty is based on so many considerations including political 
                                                          
86
 Different definitions of crimes against humanity required different elements: a nexus with an armed conflict 
like in the ICTY Statute; a discriminatory intent under the ICTR Statute; and a nexus with other crimes under 
the IMT and IMTFE Charters. 
87
 See ‘Ratification of the Rome Statute’ available at www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=romeratifications 
(accessed 15 October 2014). 
88
 See ‘Independent States of the World’ available at www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/states.htm (accessed 15 
October 2014). 
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compromises, therefore, membership to a treaty in itself does not necessarily entail 
total consensus of all the states parties but rather political compromise. In that vein, 
the Research finds that the express inclusion of the Policy Element requirement in the 
ICC Statute in itself cannot justify the conclusion that it is a general requirement. 
As for the inclusion of the Policy Element requirement in Article 18 of the 1996 ILC 
Draft Code, the Research notes that its non-binding nature vitiates its essence in 
setting the Policy Element as a requirement. Further, the inconsistent featuring of the 
Policy Element since the first ILC Draft Code in 1954 renders support to the 
plausibility of the argument that the Policy Element is not a requirement for crimes 
against humanity generally. 
3.2.2 Jurisprudence Supports the Existence of the Policy Element 
The protagonists for the existence of the Policy Element requirement have surveyed 
international and national jurisprudence on crimes against humanity. In the main, they 
argue that despite the Kunarac Decision, the evidence gleaned from the jurisprudence 
generally supports the existence of the Policy Element requirement for crimes against 
humanity. 
The first case in which crimes against humanity were charged, the Nuremberg 
Decision, did not discuss whether the Policy Element is a requirement for crimes 
against humanity or not. However, the protagonists for the existence of the Policy 
Element requirement argue that the reason the IMT did not discuss the issue 
pertaining to the Policy Element is obvious: The whole Nuremberg Trial  was 
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grounded on the Nazi plan and policy to wage aggressive war and to exterminate the 
Jews of Europe.
89
  
The protagonists of the existence of the Policy Element requirement also rely on the 
Decision of The Public Prosecutor v Menten.
90
 As already highlighted above, the 
Menten Decision held that Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter required that a crime 
against humanity should be committed in connection with some plan or policy.  
Further support for the existence of the Policy Element requirement can be garnered 
from cases under Control Council Law No. 10. For instance, cases decided in the 
Supreme Court of the British Zones 
91
 held that crimes against humanity required the 
Policy Element. In the same vein, the case of In re Altstötter held that the ‘conscious 
participation in systematic governmentally organised or approved procedures,’ was 
key for the atrocities or persecutions to qualify as crimes against humanity.
92
 
In 1995, the ICTY in the Tadic Decision
93
 made a decisive step in entrenching the 
Policy Element requirement in international criminal law. It is argued that the ICTY 
essentially held that crimes against humanity could be committed pursuant to a policy 
of either a state or a non-state actor in asymmetric armed conflicts. Similar reasoning 
was employed in the ICTR in the Bagilishema Decision.
94
   
Support for the existence of the Policy Element was weakened in the Kunarac 
Decision in 1998. As highlighted earlier, the Appeals Chamber of ICTY discarded the 
Policy Element requirement at customary international law in this Decision. The 
protagonists of the existence of the Policy Element argue that the Appeals Chamber 
                                                          
89
 The same reasoning has been advanced for the absence of a discussion concerning the Policy Element 
requirement for crimes against humanity in Attorney General for the Government of Israel vs. Adolf Eichmann 
Criminal Case No. 40/61, Judgment, 11 December 196. See also Schabas, W., (2008: 962) 
90
 The Public Prosecutor vs Menten 75 ILR 331, 362-363. 
91
 OGH br. Z.,vol. I, 19. 
92
 Mettraux, G., (2011: 163) 
93
 See The Prosecutor vs. Dusko Tadic ICTY T. Ch. II 7.5. 1997 para. 644.  
94
 The Prosecutor vs. Ignace Bagilishema ICTR. T. Ch. I 7.6.2001 para. 78. 
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erred on the bases that: It relied on the literal reading of the Article 6 of the ICTY 
Statute which does not provide for the Policy Element requirement;
95
 It overlooked 
the history and theoretical underpinnings of crimes against humanity;
96
 It ignored the 
drafting histories of crimes against humanity and the ILC Draft Codes;
97
 It selectively 
picked precedents and commentaries in support of the non-existence of the Policy 
Element;
98
 and it ignored altogether Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute in the analysis 
of whether the Policy Element is a requirement or not.
99
 
The protagonists for the existence of the Policy Element argue that the error made by 
the Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac Decision was an attempt by the ICTY to deal 
with the legal quagmire presented by asymmetric warfare in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda: The participation of non-state actors in armed conflicts.
100
 The ICTY 
was faced with question of how to deal with the appellants in the matter being 
members of paramilitaries rather than soldiers for the state. The charges of crimes 
against humanity could not hold if it were a requirement that the crimes be committed 
pursuant to a state policy. Hence, as Schabas argues, the ICTY took a ‘results-oriented 
political decision’ to hold that state policy was not a requirement for crimes against 
humanity.
101
 That way, the crimes by the appellants, though not connected to a state 
policy, could still qualify as crimes against humanity as defined under the ICTY 
Statute. 
                                                          
95
 As argued above, the Policy Element requirement is implied in all instruments providing for crimes against 
humanity save for the ICC Statute. See Schabas, W., (2008: 958) 
96
 Schabas, W., (2008: 959) 
97
 The ILC Draft Codes support the existence of the Policy Element requirement. See Schabas, W., (2008: 960) 
98
 The Decision only referred to three Canadian cases from the lower courts but ignored the then leading case on 
crimes against humanity from the Supreme Court of Canada, Regina vs. Finta. The Finta Case required the 
Policy Element for crimes against humanity. See Bassiouni, C., (2011:8) 
99
 As argued above, the express inclusion of the Policy Element in article 7 (2) (a), to a large extent, signifies 
consensus that the Policy Element is a requirement for crimes against humanity. See Bassiouni, C.,(2011:8) 
100
Bassiouni, C., (2011:7) 
101
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For the same reason above, it is argued that the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the 
ICTR preferred the ‘widespread or systematic’ attack requirement.102 This 
requirement was deemed more practical as it focussed on the quantity and quality of 
the crimes committed regardless of whether there was a state policy or not. However, 
it is argued that the use of the ‘widespread or systematic’ attack requirement can also 
be challenged on the same basis as the use of the Policy Element requirement: Both 
requirements are not expressly provided for in the statutes of the ICTY and the 
ICTR.
103
 In other words, the ‘widespread or systematic’ attack requirement is equally 
implied. Therefore, its preference over the Policy Element requirement is quite 
implausible.  It is either both are legal requirements or both are not.   
The Research finds some merit in the argument above. Indeed, ‘widespread or 
systematic’ attack requirement is equally implied in the instruments, save for the ICC 
Statute. The Research, opines that the focus of the Policy Element and the 
‘widespread or systematic’ attack requirements is essentially the same: the scale of 
harm against a civilian population.   
The Policy Element requirement serves to transcend ordinary crimes onto crimes 
against humanity as the harm envisaged to be orchestrated in furtherance of a policy 
will invariably be of remarkable magnitude. This is akin to harm resulting from 
‘widespread or systematic’ attack. Therefore, the argument above is quite plausible. 
However, the Research still maintains that the non-inclusion of the Policy Element 
requirement in the instruments vitiates the argument that it is a legal requirement. 
To surmise, the protagonists of the existence of the Policy Element requirement for 
crimes against humanity argue that their position is supported by international and 
                                                          
102
 Bassiouni, C., (2011:7) 
103
 The ‘widespread or systematic’ test was also not expressly required as an element of crimes against humanity 
in the Nuremberg Judgment. See Schabas, W., (2008: 962) 
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national jurisprudence. Jurisprudence suggesting otherwise is thus deemed based on 
erroneous considerations.   This argument is quite plausible. 
3.2.3 Sufficient State Practice and Opinio Juris to Justify the Existence of the Policy 
Element Requirement at Customary International Law 
It is argued that the Policy Element is a requirement for crimes against humanity at 
customary international law. The reasoning for this argument is that Article 7(2) (a) of 
the ICC Statute represents the culmination of all considerations in the development of 
crimes against humanity since the inception of the crime at the end of the Second 
World War. As argued above, tracing the historical path of crimes against humanity 
reveals that the Policy Element was an implied requirement in all instruments until it 
found expression in Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute. This history, so the argument 
runs, combined with the large membership of the ICC Statute manifests proof that 
states generally regard the Policy Element as a requirement for crimes against 
humanity at customary international law.  
Kress
104
 has emphatically argued that the ‘historical-teleological’ reasoning employed 
by the late Judge Kaul in his dissenting Opinion in the Decision on Authorization of 
Investigations in Kenya, strongly suggests that the Policy Element, albeit strictly 
construed, is a requirement at customary international law. Despite the possibility that 
there may be instances where customary international law may go beyond the 
definitions of crimes contained in Articles 6 to 8 of the ICC Statute as envisaged by 
Article 10, Kress further argues that there is a strong presumption that the said 
definitions do not exceed existing customary international law based on the following 
reasons.
105
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Firstly, reference is made to the Preamble of the ICC Statute that describes the crimes 
referred to in article 5(1) of the Statute as ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole’. Implicitly, this signifies some sort of consensus 
by states generally of the collective abhorrence towards the crimes.   
Secondly, Kress refers to Articles 12 (3) and 13 (b) of the ICC Statute where the ICC 
is allowed to apply Articles 6 to 8  regardless of whether the state concerned has 
ratified the ICC Statute.
106
 Impliedly, so he argues, this signifies the opinio juris for 
states to be bound by the definitions generally. 
Lastly, it is argued that there is ‘well-recorded intention of the drafters of the ICC 
Statute not to create new law, but to codify customary international law’.107 Hence, it 
is more plausible that the Policy Element requirement in Article 7 (2) (a) was mere 
codification of existing customary international law at the time.  
To surmise, therefore, it is argued that there is ample proof to justify the existence of 
the Policy Element requirement at customary international law. 
The Research has already dealt with reservations to the conclusion that the express 
inclusion of the Policy Element requirement in the ICC Statute fortifies the existence 
of the requirement at customary international law. The ICC Statute is a result of 
political compromises and not a code of absolute rules of customary international law. 
The size of its membership is significant, but does not necessarily entail state practice 
and opinio juris to justify existence of customary international law. 
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3.2.4 Legal Ramifications 
The Research has discussed arguments that the Policy Element and the ‘widespread or 
systematic’ attack requirements are implied. Holding the argument true, the existence 
of the Policy Element requirement for crimes against humanity does not change 
much. The Research has opined that the both the Policy Element and ‘widespread or 
systematic’ attack requirements focus on the scale of harm on a civilian population. 
Therefore, where the Policy Element requirement is existent both requirements would 
serve to establish the magnitude of harm on a civilian population to qualify as crimes 
against humanity. 
Further, the existence of the Policy Element at customary international law increases 
the evidential burden that the prosecution must discharge generally. Thus, the 
prosecution is legally enjoined to prove one element more than where the Policy 
Element is not a legal requirement. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
In the main, the protagonists of the existence of the Policy Element requirement argue 
that the international instruments and jurisprudence support the existence of the 
Policy Element requirement at customary law. 
The argument is that since the first codification of crimes against humanity the Policy 
Element requirement is implied in all the definitions of crimes against humanity as 
they are modelled on Article 6 (c) of the IMT Charter which presupposes that the 
Policy Element is an integral part of crimes against humanity. Although this argument 
seems plausible, it is vitiated by the non-inclusion of the Policy Element in the 
notable instruments. 
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The protagonists have argued that the existence of the Policy Element is gleaned from 
the express inclusion of the Policy Element under Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute 
as a significant indicator of the thinking and understanding of the majority of states as 
to what elements constitute crimes against humanity. The Research finds this 
argument not very persuasive on the basis that the ICC Statute is a result of political 
compromises of the membership and hence not a very reliable indicator of a 
consensus regarding crimes against humanity. 
The Research opines that the existence of the Policy Element requirement for crimes 
against humanity would entail the increasing of the evidential burden to be discharged 
by the prosecution as there would be need to prove both the Policy Element and the 
widespread attack requirements. 
Generally, the Research finds the arguments proffered by the protagonists of the 
existence of the Policy Element at customary international law less persuasive than 
those antagonist arguments. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ‘ORGANISATIONAL POLICY’ DEBATE UNDER THE ICC STATUTE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The advent of the ICC Statute in 1998 witnessed another dimension to the debate on 
the Policy Element requirement. Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute expressly provided 
for the Policy Element requirement. As highlighted earlier, according to Article 7(2) 
(a) widespread or systematic crimes would qualify as crimes against humanity only 
after being committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or organisational policy. 
The Decision on the Authorization of Investigations in Kenya
108
 in 2010 spawned a 
new debate regarding the Policy Element under Article 7(2) (a). The Judges of the 
ICC that presided over the matter and scholars that have commented on the Decision 
are divided as to whether the Policy Element envisaged in Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC 
Statute, covers states and only organisations that are ‘state-like’ or is more expansive 
to cover states and organisations in general.  
This chapter intends to survey the arguments proffered by protagonists of these 
divergent positions and the legal ramifications of the positions.  
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4.2 THE DECISION ON THE AUTHORISATION OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE 
SITUATION IN KENYA OF 31 MARCH 2010. 
4.2.1 Brief Background 
 
The Decision concerns the request by the Prosecutor of the ICC for authorisation to 
investigate the violence that ensued after the national elections in Kenya held on 27 
December 2007.  
On 30 December 2007, the Electoral Commission of Kenya declared that the then 
incumbent President, Mwai Kibaki, of the Party of National Unity had been re-elected 
into power. This was heavily contested by the main opposition candidate Raila 
Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement. This impasse resulted into violence on 
perceived rival communities in six out of eight Kenyan regions by groups of 
sympathisers and zealots of the two parties. The sympathisers and zealots were 
divided based mainly on tribal lineage and had the support of local leaders, politicians 
and even businessmen associated with the parties. The groups were neither as 
organised as state-like entities with some form of territorial control, nor did they have 
an organisational structure like that of a party to an asymmetric armed conflict. 
The violence that erupted resulted into thousands of cases of killings, rapes, and 
serious injury. There was also massive looting and wanton destruction of property and 
displacement of about 350,000 persons.  
The Prosecutor of the ICC requested the PTC II of the ICC to authorise the 
commencement of an investigation into the situation.
109
 The PTC II authorised the 
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 Office of the Prosecutor, Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, ICC-01/09, 26 
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commencement of an investigation by majority with the late Judge Hans-Peter Kaul 
dissenting.
110
   
In the dissenting opinion Judge Kaul opined that the authorisation to investigate 
alleged crimes against humanity should not have been granted because the groups that 
perpetrated the violence did not fit in the category of organisations as envisaged by 
Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute since they were not state-like in nature.
111
 
The divergence between the Majority Decision and Dissenting Opinion has raised 
fundamental questions of substance and method.
112
Firstly, it has spawned the debate 
regarding the ambit of entities envisaged to be covered under Article 7 (2) (a) of the 
ICC Statute. Secondly, it has also raised concerns as to the methodology employed in 
determining the ambit of entities envisaged.  
4.2.2 The Policy Element Requirement as Construed by the Majority Decision 
 
Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute expressly provides that crimes against humanity 
require that an attack against any civilian population must be committed ‘pursuant to 
or in furtherance of a state or organisational policy to commit such attack’. The 
Decision further held that ‘a policy adopted by regional or even local organs of the 
state could satisfy the requirement of a state policy’.113 
The Decision noted that the ICC Statute does not provide definitions of the terms 
‘policy’ or ‘state or organisational’. However, the Decision referred to earlier 
decisions that addressed the Policy Element requirement for crimes against humanity. 
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For instance, in the case against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui,
114
 PTC I found that this 
requirement:  
‘[...] ensures that the attack, even if carried out over a large geographical area 
or directed against a large number of victims, must still be thoroughly 
organised and follow a regular pattern. It must also be conducted in 
furtherance of a common policy involving public or private resources. Such a 
policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a specific 
territory or by any organisation with the capability to commit a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population. The policy need not be 
explicitly defined by the organisational group. Indeed, an attack which is 
planned, directed or organised - as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of 
violence - will satisfy this criterion’.115 
In line with the interpretation of the Policy Element requirement above, the Decision 
interpreted the ‘organisational policy’ under Article 7(2) (a) as follows: 
‘Whereas some have argued that only State-like organisations may qualify, the 
Chamber opines that the formal nature of a group and the level of its 
organisation should not be the defining criterion. Instead, as others have 
convincingly put forward, a distinction should be drawn on whether the group 
has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human values’.116 
Clearly the Decision advocates for an approach that focuses on the capacity of a group 
to perpetrate crimes that infringe on basic human values and not its character and 
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 The Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
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level of organisation. To identify whether a particular group falls within the ambit of 
organisation as envisaged under Article 7 (2) (a) the Decision provided the following 
considerations: 
‘In the view of the Chamber, the determination of whether a given group 
qualifies as an organization under the Statute must be made on a case-by-case 
basis. In making this determination, the Chamber may take into account a 
number of considerations, inter alia: (i) whether the group is under a 
responsible command, or has an established hierarchy; (ii) whether the group 
possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread or systematic attack 
against a civilian population; (iii) whether the group exercises control over 
part of the territory of a State; (iv)whether the group has criminal activities 
against the civilian population as a primary purpose; (v) whether the group 
articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an intention to attack a civilian population; 
(vi) whether the group is part of a larger group, which fulfils some or all of the 
aforementioned criteria’.117 
The Decision stressed that the considerations listed above were merely meant to help 
in identifying groups that qualified as organisations for purposes of article 7(2) (a) of 
the ICC Statute. However, the considerations needed not be satisfied exhaustively in 
each case.
118
 
With the reasoning highlighted above, the Decision held that the ‘various groups 
including local leaders, businessmen and politicians associated with the two leading 
parties, as well as with members of the police force’ acting in Kenya at the material 
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time constituted organisations within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute.
119
 
Therefore, the crimes committed in furtherance of policies, express or implied, of 
groups above could qualify as crimes as crimes against humanity. 
4.2.3 Legal Ramifications  
The Research notes that the Decision resonates with the downgrading of the Policy 
Element requirement akin to the Kunarac Decision. Following the reasoning of the 
Decision would entail that the organisations capable of formulating a policy to 
orchestrate a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population envisaged 
under Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute include private groups such as businessmen, 
local leaders and politicians. In other words, the determining factor for organisations 
envisaged under Article 7(2) (a) is the capacity of such organisations to infringe on 
basic human values. 
Further, being a Majority Decision, the Decision reflects the position tenable in the 
ICC at the moment regarding the organisations envisaged under Article 7(2) (a). The 
ICC will surely have recourse to this Decision when faced with an issue of 
interpretation of organisational policy in future cases.
120
 
The Decision also affects the evidential burden to be discharged by the prosecution 
with respect to organisational policy. The evidential burden required is more stringent 
than in the Kunarac Decision where the Policy Element requirement was discarded 
altogether. What is required is evidence that an organisation with sufficient capacity 
to orchestrate widespread and systematic attacks against a civilian population 
formulates a policy to attack and follows the policy through. However, the burden of 
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proof is mitigated slightly by the allowance given that the Policy Element can be 
inferred from circumstances.
121
   
Lastly, the Decision also affects the evidential burden to be discharged with respect to 
state policy. The Decision holds that evidence of ‘a policy adopted by regional or 
even local organs of the State could satisfy the requirement of a State policy’. Thus, 
the prosecution need not prove that the policy was adopted at the highest echelons of 
public power. This also mitigates the evidential burden to be discharged by the 
prosecution. 
4.2.4 The Policy Element Requirement as Construed by the Dissenting Opinion 
The late Judge Kaul questioned whether the ICC was the right forum to deal with the 
perpetrators of the post- election violence in Kenya.
122
  Kaul made it clear that the 
determinative legal question was the proper ‘demarcation line between crimes against 
humanity pursuant to Article 7 of the Statute, and crimes under national law’.123  
The Dissenting Opinion cautioned that the interpretation of organisational policy 
adopted in the Majority Decision had the potential of infringing on state sovereignty 
as crimes which would ordinarily be within the purview of domestic courts would 
transcend onto that of the ICC Statute.
124
 
According to the Dissenting Opinion, an organisation as envisaged by Article 7(2) (a) 
of the ICC Statute must have some characteristics of a state. The Opinion lists down 
the following characteristics:  
                                                          
121
 The Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 
Case No. ICC-01/04–01/07–717, PTC I, 30 September 2008 para. 396 
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‘(a) a collectivity of persons; (b) which was established and acts for a common 
purpose; (c) over a prolonged period of time; (d) which is under responsible 
command or adopted a certain degree of hierarchical structure, including, as a 
minimum, some kind of policy level; (e) with the capacity to impose the 
policy on its members and to sanction them; and (f) which has the capacity 
and means available to attack any civilian population on a large scale’.125 
Hence, the Dissenting Opinion held that the groups that perpetrated the post-election 
violence in Kenya did not satisfy the above characteristics and thus were not the 
organisations envisaged under Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute.  
4.2.5 Legal Ramifications 
 
The Research notes that the Dissenting Opinion advocates for a more stringent test in 
determining organisational policy as envisaged under Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC 
Statute. Only organisations that have state-like qualities are considered to be 
envisaged. Had this standard been applied in the Kenya Situation, crimes committed 
by the various groups could not have qualified as crimes against humanity under the 
ICC Statute.  
The stringent test applied in the Dissenting Opinion would affect the evidential 
burden for the prosecution for charges of crimes against humanity. There would be 
need for proof not only that the entity that formulated the policy to orchestrate 
widespread or systematic crimes had the capacity to do so but also that it had specific 
characteristics that make the entity state-like. 
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Lastly, the fact that it was a Dissenting Opinion relegates its use as authority. 
However, it is still significant as it has birthed the debate concerning the precise ambit 
of organisational policy as envisaged in Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute. 
4.3 SCHOLARLY ARGUMENTS 
4.3.1 The Narrow Approach: Policy of a State or State-like Entities  
 
The above approach entails the stringent interpretation of the Policy Element 
envisaged under Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute to cover states and state-like 
entities.  This is the approach adopted by the late Judge Kaul above in the Dissenting 
Opinion. Claus Kress critiques the reasoning employed both in the Decision and the 
Dissenting Opinion. However, he comes to the same conclusion as the Dissenting 
Opinion. 
Firstly, Kress looks at the reasoning that underlies the Majority Decision. He 
identifies three key arguments advanced for the interpretation of organisational policy 
adopted: that the drafters of the ICC Statute intended an expansive interpretation of 
organisational policy by explicitly including the term organisational policy in Article 
7(2) (a);
126
 that the ILC Draft Code affirms the possibility that ‘criminal gangs or 
groups’ may be covered as entities behind crimes against humanity;127 and that the 
wide construction of the concept of organisation in Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute 
is preferable as it would help to protect basic human values in general.
128
  
Kress dismisses the first argument that underlies the Majority Decision for being 
misplaced. He argues that the inclusion of the term organisational policy in Article 
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 Kress, C., (2010: 859). See also Commentary to the ILC Draft Code 1991. 
128
 Kress, C., (2010: 859. 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute is not in dispute at all, but the precise ambit of entities 
envisaged under it.
129
 Therefore the Majority Decision should not have relied on this 
argument to justify its interpretation of organisational policy. 
With respect to the second argument, Kress argues that the Majority Decision did not 
clarify the status of recourse to ILC Draft Codes within the rubric of interpretation. 
Essentially, his argument is that the ILC Draft Codes reflect the position of 
international criminal law at a particular point and thus the Majority Decision should 
have elaborately discussed why it relied on the ILC Draft Code in the interpretation of 
organisational policy under Article 7(2) (a). Otherwise, the ILC Draft Codes are not 
binding on the ICC Statute. 
Kress admits that the third argument is implicit in the Majority Decision. The 
argument is premised on the purpose of international law on crimes against humanity: 
the protection of basic human values. Kress criticises the manifest teleological 
interpretation of organisational policy under the ICC Statute on the basis that it 
focuses more on the protection of the victims of human rights violations regardless of 
the distinct nature of international criminal law and international human rights law. 
International criminal law is seen as a tool to protect international human rights 
values. Kress argues that this is a fallacy as the obligations created under the two 
fields of law are directed towards different players: states, for international human 
rights law; and individuals, for international criminal law.
130
 
Secondly, Kress looks at the Dissenting Opinion. Essentially, Kress agrees with the 
stringent interpretation of organisational policy as held by Judge Kaul on the basis 
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that such an approach is internally consistent
131
 and in conformity with the principle 
of strict interpretation as required by the preamble and Article 22 of the ICC Statute. 
However, he adds that the conclusion reached in Dissenting Opinion could also be 
justifiable on the basis of customary international law. 
He argues that the ‘historical–teleological’ reasoning employed in the Dissenting 
Opinion very strongly suggests that the narrow interpretation of the term 
‘organisation’ reflects customary international law.132 He surmises by suggesting that 
the reasoning for Dissenting Opinion would have been better phrased in this way: 
Under existing customary international law, crimes against humanity require a policy 
by a state or a state-like organisation. Therefore, the term ‘organisation’ in Article 
7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute must be construed accordingly.
133
 
The Research does not find the stringent interpretation of organisational policy 
advanced by Kress very persuasive for the following reasons. 
Firstly, it has been seen, that either the Policy Element requirement or the ‘widespread 
or systematic’ attack requirement has been used to distinguish whether crimes 
committed are crimes against humanity. The focus has always been on the scale of 
harm on civilian population. Article 7(2) (a) contains both requirements. It is, 
therefore, against this reasoning that the interpretation of the term ‘organisational 
policy,’ should be restricted to cover only state-like organisations. The harm as a 
result of crimes against humanity envisioned can equally be done by organisations 
that do not have any state-like characteristics. Thus, the term ‘organisational policy’ 
must cover organisations generally. After all, if the drafters of the ICC Statute 
                                                          
131
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intended such a stringent interpretation they would have expressly provided for such a 
limitation. 
Extrapolating the argument further, limiting the term organisation to state-like entities 
where no express provision to that effect is provided for in Article 7(2) (a) vitiates 
reasoning behind the requirement for such stringent test given that customary 
international law does not require it at all. It has been seen earlier on, that at 
customary international law, the most persuasive argument is that the Policy Element 
is not a requirement. It has been seen further that, the ICC Statute should cautiously 
be taken to entrench customary international law norms as it is a creature of political 
compromise amongst other considerations. It follows, therefore, that the inclusion of 
the Policy Element does not reflect customary international law. Further, restricting 
‘organisational policy’ to cover only state-like organisations does not reflect 
customary international law. 
4.3.2 The Ordinary Meaning Approach: Policy of the State or Organisations 
 
Other Scholars like Gerhard Werle and Boris Burghardt
134
 advocate for an 
interpretation of organisational policy in the ICC Statute that focuses on the ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘organisation’ in Article 7(2) (a).135  
According to Werle and Burghardt the Policy Element in Article 7(2) (a) covers any 
organisation with sufficient capacity to carry out widespread or systematic attack on a 
civilian population.  The underlying reasoning for the argument is premised on the 
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Tadic Decision which held that the focus should be on the protection of individuals’ 
rights and not which entities commit the violations of the rights.
136
  
Firstly, Werle and Burghardt argue that the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘organisation’ under Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute encompasses organisations 
that have no link to the state and even do not have state-like qualities. It is argued that 
the ordinary meaning of the term ‘organisation’ is ‘an association of persons 
possessing structures that make it possible, beyond a single concrete situation, to 
coordinate actions purposefully and attribute actions to the organisation.’137  Thus the 
term organisation under Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute should be understood to 
encompass all the associations of persons with the above characteristics. Notably, the 
definition of ‘organisation’ derived by Werle and Burghardt accords with the 
definition adopted by the Majority Decision. 
It is also argued that any interpretation that limits or deviates from the above ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘organisation’ as defined above by requiring an additional 
qualifier, for instance that the organisation be state-like, is incorrect.
138
 Werle and 
Burghardt argue that the fact that Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute provides for a 
‘state or organisational policy’ entails that both states and organisations share 
normative equality but not the same definitional characteristics: the organisations 
need not have state-like characteristics.
139
 
It is further argued that even though the attacks by states unquestionably represent the 
standard case in crimes against humanity, there is no valid argument to deny that 
similar attacks carried out by organisations should be treated as crimes against 
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humanity.  The underlying threat to world peace would still be the same in both 
cases.
140
 Thus, such teleological considerations offer support to the inclusion of 
organisations which are not state-like at all, for instance the ones that perpetrated the 
post-election violence in Kenya.
141
   
Lastly, it is argued that customary international law does not require the Policy 
Element at all. Hence, requiring a stringent test in interpreting the organisational 
policy under the ICC Statute does not accord with customary international law.
142
  
As seen above, the Research finds merit in this argument. Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC 
Statute has no qualifier to limit the term ‘organisational policy’ as has been suggested 
by protagonists of the stringent interpretation.  
Further, the focus on the capacity of an organisation to orchestrate and carry out 
‘widespread or systematic’ attack accords with the reasoning underlying both the 
Policy Element and ‘widespread or systematic’ attack requirements: distinguishing 
ordinary crimes from crimes against humanity requiring international intervention. 
Arguably, the fact that ICC Statute came into being in 1998 after the ICTY and ICTR 
where the Tribunals had already encountered a quandary of how to deal with non-
state actors in non-international armed conflicts entails that the drafters of the ICC 
had envisaged the organisations that were to be covered. Hence, they could have 
explicitly restricted the organisations within the ICC Statute and not left it open for 
the ICC to fill in the qualifier ‘state-like’.  
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Lastly, holding the argument that the ILC Draft Codes reflect the prevailing position 
within the international criminal law discourse, the Policy Element provided for in the 
commentary on Article 18 of the 1996 ILC Draft Code stated thus: 
‘…[t]he instigation or direction of a Government or any organisation or group, 
which may or may not be affiliated with a Government, gives the act its great 
dimension and makes it a crime against humanity imputable to private persons 
or agents of a state’.143 
The formulation above, merely two years before the advent of the ICC Statute, clearly 
envisages organisations that go beyond those having state-like characteristics. This 
would most likely have been the prevailing idea at the time the ICC Statute was 
negotiated and thus informed the drafting of the Policy Element in Article 7(2) (a). 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The major contention in The Decision on the Authorization of an Investigation into 
the Situation in Republic of Kenya is the interpretation of the term ‘organisational 
policy’ in Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute envisaged only state-like organisations or 
organisations in general.  
The Majority Decision interpreted the ‘organisational policy’ under Article 7(2) (a) to 
cover all organisations while the Dissenting Opinion narrowed the meaning to only 
state-like organisations. The interpretation of the Majority Decision is supported 
Werle and Burghardt. Claus Kress supports the Dissenting Opinion.  
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The Majority Decision entails that widespread or systematic crime against a civilian 
population committed by private organisations such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, Al-
Shabab and others with discernible policies are covered within the term 
‘organisational policy’ under Article 7(2)(a) of the ICC Statute.  
The Majority Decision also entails a more stringent evidential burden for the 
Prosecution than in the Kunarac Decision with respect to both state and organisational 
policy. It further affects the evidential burden to be discharged with respect to state 
policy as the adoption of policies at regional or local level is attributable to the state. 
This mitigates the evidential burden to be discharged by the Prosecution. 
This Research finds the reasoning of the Majority Decision supported by Werle and 
Burghardt more persuasive than the stringent approach adopted in the Dissenting 
Opinion supported by Kress. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The Research Paper set out to provide a comprehensive understanding of the two 
interconnected debates concerning the Policy Element in international criminal 
law. The first debate involves the question whether the Policy Element is a 
requirement for crimes against humanity at customary international law. The 
second one relates to the question whether the term ‘organisational policy’ under 
the ICC Statute envisages any organisation or only an organisation that is state-
like. The preceding chapters have adequately dealt with the debates in terms 
content, reasoning and the legal ramifications of the divergent positions taken. 
 
This Chapter will draw conclusions from the preceding discussion. The Chapter 
will further attempt recommendations as to whether the Policy Element should be 
a legal requirement for crimes against humanity. 
5.2 THE POLICY ELEMENT REQUIREMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
5.2.1 The Policy Element under Customary International law 
 
The Research has found that protagonists of the non-existence of Policy Element 
find support in the Kunarac Decision of the ICTY. However, the Kunarac 
Decision is criticised for being unelaborate. Legal scholars such as Guenael 
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Mettraux and Goran Sluiter also render their support to the finding in the Kunarac 
Decision.  
In the main, the argument proffered is that a survey of international instruments 
and jurisprudence since the first codification of crimes against humanity in the 
IMT Charter until the ICTY and ICTR Statutes indicates that the Policy Element 
was not expressly provided for. The Research finds this argument very plausible. 
Logically, the Policy Element, a factor that transcends ordinary crimes onto 
crimes against humanity, should be expressly provided for in the various 
instruments. Its exclusion from the notable instruments vitiates the argument that 
it is an element for crimes against humanity at customary law.  
 
Further, the Research argues that the divergence of opinion regarding the Policy 
Element requirement that grounds this debate does also provide support to the 
conclusion that the Policy Element is not a requirement at customary international 
law. As noted above, international custom must be verified by general practice 
accepted as law. The divergence in opinion indicates difference in practice and 
opinio juris. 
 
On the other side of the debate, the main argument is that the Policy Element 
requirement is implied in all the definitions of crimes against humanity as they are 
modelled on Article 6 (c) of the IMT Charter which presupposes that the Policy 
Element is an integral part of crimes against humanity. The Research finds that 
this argument is also vitiated by the non-inclusion of the Policy Element in the 
notable instruments. 
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With the arguments above, generally, the Research finds the arguments proffered 
by the protagonists of the existence of the Policy Element at customary 
international law less persuasive than the antagonist arguments.  
 
With that conclusion, the Research postulates that the non-existence of the Policy 
Element requirement for crimes against humanity would entail that at customary 
law widespread and systematic crimes committed by private entities having no 
plan or policy to commit the said crimes would qualify as crimes against 
humanity. Thus, as Schabas had alluded to earlier on, crimes committed by serial 
killers, the Mafia, motorcycle gangs and terrorist bands could qualify as crimes 
against humanity so long as they are committed in a widespread and systematic 
manner even where there is no discernible policy or plan. 
 
The Research finds the postulation above in tandem with the spirit and intendment 
of contemporary international criminal law: the curbing of impunity for serious 
crimes of global concern.  The non-existence of the Policy Element is helpful in 
closing loopholes created in international criminal law by the proliferation of 
asymmetric armed conflicts and groups with the capacity to orchestrate and carry 
out attacks on the civilian population. 
5.2.2 The Policy Element under the ICC Statute  
 
Recently, the Situation in the Republic of Kenya has confronted the ICC with a 
contention about the concept of organisation within the Policy Element 
requirement in Article 7(2) (a). The contention has birthed a debate as to the term 
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‘organisational policy’ in Article 7(2) (a) envisages only state-like organisations 
or organisations in general. 
The Majority Decision followed recent jurisprudence of the ICTY and interpreted 
the ‘organisational policy’ under Article 7(2) (a) to cover all organisations. Judge 
Kaul dissented and narrowed the meaning to only state-like organisations. The 
interpretation of the Majority Decision is supported Werle and Burghardt. Claus 
Kress supports the Dissenting Opinion. 
This Research finds the reasoning underlying the Majority Decision and the 
commentaries in support more persuasive than that of the Dissenting Opinion. The 
major thrust of the argument for the Research is that there is nothing in Article 
7(2) (a) to support qualification of ‘organisational policy’ to be limited to only 
state-like organisations. 
Legally, The Majority Decision entails that private organisations with discernible 
policies to commit widespread or systematic crimes are covered under Article 7(2) 
(a) of the ICC Statute. This resonates with the Kunarac Decision to a large extent: 
The Policy Element under the ICC Statute covers states and organisations in 
general. The only difference is that in the ICTY crimes committed by states and 
organisations without any Policy Element would be crimes against humanity as 
long as they are widespread and systematic. 
5.3 SHOULD THE POLICY ELEMENT BE A REQUIREMENT FOR CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY? 
 
The Research has found that the historic context of discarding the Policy Element 
requirement by the ICTY lay in the need to accommodate widespread and 
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systematic crimes committed by non-state actors in asymmetric armed conflicts 
that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda within the law of crimes 
against humanity and genocide.  It has been seen that similar reasoning informed 
the formulation of Article 7(2) (a) of the ICC Statute. 
Further, the Research has found that there seem to be two contextual elements for 
crimes against humanity: The ‘Policy Element’ and the ‘widespread and 
systematic’ attack requirements. The Research, therefore, postulates that there is 
uncertainty as to what Policy Element requirement contributes to crimes against 
humanity that is not already covered by the ‘widespread or systematic’ attack 
requirement. The non-existence of the Policy Element requirement, as argued 
earlier on, does not negatively affect the ambit or prosecution of crimes against 
humanity.  
Additionally, Matt Halling argues for the amending of the ICC Statute to remove 
the state or organisational policy requirement for similar reasoning. He argues that 
having the Policy Element within the ICC Statute creates a loophole that would 
serve to grant impunity to some widespread or systematic crimes that would have 
been covered as crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute but for the lack of 
the Policy Element.
144
  
With the premises above, the Research postulates that the Policy Element should 
not be a requirement for crimes against humanity at all. 
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5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.4.1 A Convention of Crimes against Humanity 
 
The Research notes that there is already an inclination within the international 
criminal law discourse to have a convention on crimes against humanity.
145
 Other 
crimes under international law already have specialised conventions, save for the 
crime of aggression.
146
  
With this background, the Research recommends adoption of a specialised 
convention for crimes against humanity and most particularly the inclusion of a 
definition of crimes against humanity that does not include the Policy Element 
requirement. The recommended definition should mirror that articulated in Article 
7 of the ICC Statute minus the portion in Article 7(2) (a) that reads ‘pursuant to or 
in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack’. This 
would effectively remove the Policy Element from the definition. 
5.4.2 Amendment to Article 7 (2) (a) of the ICC Statute 
 
Based on the reasoning above, the Research recommends that Article 7 should be 
amended in accordance with ICC procedure under Article 121 to remove the 
Policy Element requirement. The definition of crimes against humanity under 
Article 7 would mirror the proposed definition in the Convention on Crimes 
against Humanity above without any Policy Element requirement. 
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